Um einen schnellen Eindruck zu bekommen, lies doch am Besten kurz folgenden Teil von Hoppe aus dem zweiten Link:
The Idea of a Private Law Society
In light of the multiple errors of classical liberalism, then, how is law and order vis-à-vis actual and potential lawbreakers maintained? The solution lies in a private law society — a society where every individual and institution is subject to one and the same set of laws! No public law granting privileges to specific persons of functions (and no public property) exists in this society. There is only private law (and private property), equally applicable to each and everyone. No one is permitted to acquire property by any other means than through original appropriation, production, or voluntary exchange; and no one possesses the privilege to tax and expropriate. Moreover, no one in a private law society is permitted to prohibit anyone else from using his property in order to enter any line of production and compete against whomever he pleases.
More specifically, in order to be just and efficient, the production and maintenance of law will have to be undertaken by freely financed and competing individuals and agencies. How can this be done? While it is impossible to predict the precise shape and form that the "security industry" would take within the framework of a private law society — just as it is impossible to predict the specific structure of almost any industry under such hitherto non-existing circumstances — a significant number of fundamental structural changes as compared to the status quo of state-provided security protection can be predicted.
First, in complex societies one aspect of the emerging solution will only be of secondary importance, but under no circumstances should it be overlooked. Whereas the statist provision of law and order has led to the successive disarmament of the population, rendering it increasingly defenseless against lawbreakers, in a private law society essentially no restrictions on the private ownership of firearms and other weapons would exist. Everyone's elementary right to engage in self-defense to protect one's life and property against invaders would be sacrosanct, and as one knows from the experience of the not-so-wild Wild West, as well as numerous empirical investigations into the relationship between the frequency of gun ownership and crime rates, more guns imply less crime. Intuition dictates this, but government propaganda relentlessly tries to deny it.
However, in complex modern societies self-defense will constitute only a small part in the overall production of security. In today's world we do not produce our own shoes, suits and telephones; we partake in the advantages of the division of labor. This is also true of the production of security. To a large extent, we rely on specialized agents and agencies to protect our life and property. In particular, most people rely on freely financed and competing insurance companies for their protection, and this reliance on insurers will tend to increase and intensify the greater and more valuable the quantity of one's property. Insurance companies in turn will associate and cooperate with police and detective agencies, either directly as a subdivision of the insurance company or indirectly as separate business entities. At the same time, insurance agencies will cooperate constantly with internal and with independent, external arbitrators and arbitration agencies.
How would this competitive system of interconnected insurance, police, and arbitration agencies work?
Competition among insurers, police, and arbitrators for paying clients would bring about a tendency toward a continuous fall in the price of protection (per insured value), thus rendering protection more affordable. In contrast, a monopolistic protector who may tax the protected can charge ever higher prices for his services.
Furthermore, as already indicated, protection and security are goods and services that compete with others. If more resources are allocated to protection, fewer can be expended on cars, vacations, food, or drink, for example. Also, resources allocated to the protection of A or group A (people living along the Pacific) for instance, compete with resources expended on the protection of B or group B (people living along the Atlantic). As a tax-funded protection monopolist, the state's allocation of resources will necessarily be arbitrary. There will be overproduction (or underproduction) of security as compared to other competing goods and services, and there will be overprotection of some individuals, groups, or regions and under-protection of others.
In distinct contrast, in a system of freely competing protection agencies all arbitrariness of allocation (all over- and underproduction) would vanish. Protection would be accorded the relative importance that is has in the eyes of voluntarily paying consumers, and no person, group, or region would receive protection at the expense of any other one, but each would receive protection in accordance with its payments.
In addition, insurers would have to indemnify their clients in the case of actual damage; hence, they must operate efficiently. Regarding social disasters (crime) in particular, this means that the insurer would be concerned above all with effective prevention, for unless he could prevent a crime, he would have to pay up. Further, if a criminal act could not be prevented, an insurer would still want to recover the loot, apprehend the offender, and bring him to justice, for in so doing the insurer could reduce his costs and force the criminal — rather than the victim and his insurer — to pay for the damages and cost of indemnification.
In distinct contrast, as compulsory monopolists states do not indemnify victims, and because they can resort to taxation as a source of funding, they have little or no incentive to prevent crime or to recover loot and capture criminals. Indeed, if they do manage to apprehend a criminal, they typically force the taxpaying victim and others to pay for the criminal's incarceration, thus adding insult to injury.
It has already been pointed out that private law societies are characterized by an unrestricted right to self-defense and hence by widespread private gun and weapon ownership. This tendency is further strengthened by the important role of insurance companies in such societies. All states attempt to disarm their subject population, for the obvious reason that it is less dangerous to collect taxes from an unarmed than from an armed man. If a freely financed insurance company were to demand as a prerequisite of protection that potential clients hand over all means of self-defense, it would immediately arouse the utmost suspicion as to their true motives, and they would quickly go bankrupt. In their own best interest, insurance companies would reward armed clients, in particular those able to certify some level of training in the handling of arms, charging them lower premiums reflecting the lower risk that they represent. Just as insurers charge less if home owners have an alarm system or a safe installed, so would a trained gun owner represent a lower insurance risk.
As tax-funded monopolists of ultimate decision making, states can externalize the costs associated with aggressive behavior onto hapless taxpayers. Hence, states are by nature more prone to become aggressors and warmongers than agents or agencies that must themselves bear the costs involved in aggression and war. Insurance companies are by their very nature defensive rather than aggressive agencies. On the one hand this is so because every act of aggression is costly, and an insurance company engaged in aggressive conduct would require comparatively higher premiums, implying the loss of clients to non-aggressive competitors.
On the other hand, it is not possible to insure oneself against every conceivable "risk." Rather, it is only possible to insure oneself against "accidents," i.e., risks over whose outcome the insured has no control and to which he contributes nothing. Thus, it is possible to insure oneself against the risk of death and fire, for instance, but it is impossible to insure oneself against the risk of committing suicide or setting one's own house on fire. Similarly, it is impossible to insure oneself against the risk of business failure, of unemployment, or of disliking one's neighbors, for in each case one has some control over the event in question.
Most significantly, the un-insurability of individual actions and sentiments (in contradistinction to accidents) implies that it is also impossible to insure oneself against the risk of damages resulting from one's own prior aggression or provocation. Instead, every insurer must restrict the actions of his clients so as to exclude all aggression and provocation on their part. That is, any insurance against social disasters such as crime must be contingent on the insured submitting themselves to specified norms of non-aggressive conduct. Incidentally, due to the same reasons and financial concerns, insurers will tend to require that all their clients abstain from all forms of vigilante justice (except perhaps under quite extraordinary circumstances), for vigilante justice, even if justified, invariably causes uncertainty and provokes possible third party intervention. By obliging their clients instead to submit to regular publicized procedures whenever they think they have been victimized, these disturbances and associated costs can be largely avoided.
Lastly, it is worth pointing out that while states as tax funded agencies can — and do — engage in the large-scale prosecution of victimless crimes such as "illegal drug" use, prostitution, or gambling, these "crimes" would tend to be of little or no concern within a system of freely funded protection agencies. "Protection" against such "crimes" would require higher insurance premiums, but since these "crimes," unlike genuine crimes against persons and property, do not create victims, very few people would be willing to spend money on such "protection."
Last and most important, a system of competing protection agencies would have a two-fold impact on the development of law. On the one hand, it would allow for greater variability of law. Rather than imposing a uniform set of standards onto everyone (as under statist conditions), protection agencies could compete against each other not just via price but also through product differentiation. There could exist side by side, for instance, Catholic protection agencies or insurers applying Canon law, Jewish agencies applying Mosaic law, Muslim agencies applying Islamic law, and agencies applying secular law of one variety or another, all of them sustained by a voluntarily paying clientele. Consumers could choose the law applied to them and their property. No one would have to live under "foreign" law.
On the other hand, the very same system of private law and order production would promote a tendency toward the unification of law. The "domestic" law — Catholic, Jewish, Roman, etc. — would apply only to the person and property of those who had chosen it, the insurer, and all others insured by the same insurer under the same law. Canon law, for instance, would apply only to professed Catholics and deal solely with intra-Catholic conflict and conflict resolution. Yet it is also possible, of course, that a Catholic might come into conflict with the subscriber of some other law code, e.g., a Muslim. If both law codes reached the same or a similar conclusion, no difficulties exist.
However, if competing law codes arrived at distinctly different conclusions (as they would at least in some cases), a problem arises. "Domestic" (intra-group) law would be useless, but every insured person would want protection against the contingency of inter-group conflicts as well. In this situation it cannot be expected that one insurer and the subscribers of its law code simply subordinate their judgment to that of another insurer and its law. Rather, for all the parties involved there is only one credible and acceptable way out of this predicament.
From the outset, every insurer would be compelled to submit itself and its clients to arbitration by a truly independent third party. This party would not only be an independent entity, however, but at the same time the unanimous choice of both parties. It would be agreed upon because of its commonly perceived ability to find mutually agreeable (fair) solutions in cases of inter-group disagreement. Moreover, if an arbitrator failed in this task and arrived at conclusions that were perceived as "unfair" or "biased" by either one of the insurers or their clients, this person or agency would not likely be chosen as an arbitrator in the future.
In sum, protection and security contracts would come into existence. Insurers (unlike states) would offer their clients contracts with well-specified property descriptions and clearly defined duties and obligations. Likewise, the relationship between insurers and arbitrators would be governed by contract. Each party to a contract, for the duration or until fulfillment of the contract, would be bound by its terms and conditions; and every change in the terms or conditions of a contract would require the unanimous consent of all parties concerned. That is, in a private law society, unlike under statist conditions, no "legislation" would exist. No insurer could get away with promising its clients protection without letting them know how or at what price, and insisting that it could unilaterally change the terms and conditions of the protector-client relationship. Insurance-clients would demand something significantly better, and insurers would supply contracts and constant law, instead of promises and shifting and changing legislation.
Furthermore, as a result of the continual cooperation of various insurers and arbitrators, a tendency toward the unification of property and contract law and the harmonization of the rules of procedure, evidence, and conflict resolution would be set in motion. Through buying protection-insurance, everyone would share in the common goal of striving to reduce conflict and enhance security. Moreover, every single conflict and damage claim, regardless of where and by or against whom, would fall into the jurisdiction of one or more specific insurance agencies and would be handled either by an individual insurer's "domestic" law or by the "international" law provisions and procedures agreed upon in advance by a group of insurers.
Such a system would assure more complete and perfect legal stability and certainty than any system of security to which we can currently appeal.
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) und Anarchie scheint die konsequenteste Auslegung zu sein, die auch Rand hätte vertreten sollen, um in ihrer Theorie konsistent zu sein. Aber auch wenn wir uns gegenseitig 'logische Fehler' vorwerfen, so sind die Positionen doch 'ähnlich' genug, um bei solchen Diskussionen auch der gleichen Seite zu stehen.
sorry, aber Supermärkte werden zum Glück (noch) nicht durch den Staat reguliert, sondern es würden in einem Modell ohne Staat die 19% Mwst. wegfallen (etc.)
